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ADVERTISING BY LAWYERS: SOME PROS AND CONS
MORLEY WALKER*

In August 1978 the American Bar Association' approved amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility that added television
to the media in which lawyer advertising is permissible. 2 Even though
this was a minor codicil to the will of the ABA published in the 1977
amendments to the Code permitting newspaper, magazine and radio
ads, 3 the heat was intense. Still, it may be some time before we see our
favorite model urging us to submit to the comforts of a Chapter 11
bankruptcy. James Russell Lowell said it best:
New occasions teach new duties;
Time makes ancient good uncouth;
They must upward still, and onward,
4
Who would keep abreast of Truth.
No matter of dinner table discussion has so enthralled the legal
* University of California, Berkeley; J.D., University of Chicago; Member, California and
Michigan Bar.
1. Hereinafter referred to as the ABA.
2. On August 9, 1978, the ABA House of Delegates approved the following amendments to
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Additions are in italics):
EC 2-8
Selection of a lawyer by a layperson should be made on an informed basis. Advice and
recommendation of third parties-relatives, friends, acquaintances, business associates,
or other lawyers-and disclosure of relevant information about the lawyer and his practice may be helpful. A layperson is best served if the recommendation is disinterested
and informed. In order that the recommendation be disinterested, a lawyer should not
seek to influence another to recommend his employment. A lawyer should not compensate another person for recommending him, for influencing a prospective client to employ him, or to encourage future recommendations. Advertisements and public
communications, whether in law lists, telephone directories, newspapers, other forms of
print media, television or radio, should be formulated to convey only information that is
necessary to make an appropriate selection ...
DR 2-101(B)
In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential consumers
of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-103, the following
information in print media distributed or over television or radio broadcasted in the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a
significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the information disclosed
by the lawyer in such publication or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A), and is
presented in a dignified manner. ...
DR 2-101(D)
If the advertisement is communicated to the public over television or radio, it shall be
prerecorded, approved for broadcast by the lawyer, and a recording of the actual transmission shall be retained by the lawyer.

3.

ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 2 (Amendments to Canon 2 of the CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, August 10, 1977).
4. J. LOWELL, THE PRESENT CRISIS, Stanza 18 (1844).
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profession-and the long-suffering laity-than the appropriate delivery
of legal services to the public. The question of lawyer advertising is the
tip of that remarkable iceberg. The cutting edge will not be the question of the propriety of advertising. The real issue is whether advertising and other forms of publicity and solicitation will aid in the delivery
of services that the public has the right to seek and the profession, as
exclusive licensee, has the responsibility to offer. The question has constitutional, economic and professional implications. This article will
attempt to deal with each of these in turn and to offer some observations.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTION

The constitutional issue falls into three areas: (1) free speech; (2)
the right to counsel; and (3) unreasonable restriction upon commerce.
Free Speech
Are the right to advertise and the right to be informed through
advertising and other forms of publicity constitutionally protected free
speech? Are there, as some consumer groups argue, no appropriate restrictions? In a series of cases, beginning with Valentine v. Chrestensen5
the ground work was laid that "commercial speech" is not entitled to
first amendment protection. 6 The doctrine is limited. For example, in
the famous case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,7 a city official instituted a civil libel action against four clergymen and the New York
Times, based upon a Times advertisement criticizing police action
against civil rights activists. 8 The United States Supreme Court held
that even though the Times had been paid for the advertisement, the
publication was entitled to the same measure of constitutional protection as ordinary speech. 9 In contrast, where an advertisement violated
some valid limitation on economic activity-e.g., an ordinance forbidding newspapers to carry help-wanted advertisements in sex-designated
columns-first amendment protection could not be justified. l°
5. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
6. The first amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. The advertisement also solicited contributions for such causes as the legal defense of
Martin Luther King, Jr. 376 U.S. at 257.
9. Id. at 266.
10. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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Advertising as Free Speech
With the growth of consumer interest, advertising, though admittedly commercial speech, has been awarded increasing protection. In
Bigelow v. Virginia" a Virginia statute prohibited the advertising of
abortion services, then illegal in Virginia. A newspaper editor was convicted under the statute for publishing an advertisement regarding the
availability of legal abortions in New York.' 2 The Supreme Court
found that such an absolute ban on commercial advertising was contrary to the first amendment.' 3 Here, the Court reasoned, the advertisement "'contained factual material of clear public interest.' "'4 It did
not merely "propose a commercial transaction."' 5
Notwithstanding the Bigelow decision, the public has a legitimate
stake in the regulation of advertising, as exemplified by the activities of
the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications
Commission. Hence, reasonable regulation grounded in the public interest and affecting time, place, and manner of advertisements will be
upheld. Broad prohibitions will usually be overturned by applying the
familiar balancing test between public interest and individual liberty.
Thus, if the bar were to permit advertising generally, legislatively
credentialed bar associations could still control the advertising done by
lawyers.
Advertising as Solicitation
In Belli v. State Bar of California16 the Supreme Court of California examined the distribution of brochures advertising Belli's lectures.
The California State Bar contended that these brochures were used to
obtain clients for Belli's law practice rather than audiences for the seminars.' 7 The court found that if a lawyer's activity is constitutionally
protected, the lawyer can ethically advertise and promote the protected
activity, provided the advertising is not principally directed to generating business for the lawyer's practice.' This holding is apparently applicable only with respect to advertising for constitutionally protected
activities and is not applicable to a lawyer's endorsement of purely
commercial products. Thus, an advertisement which cited Belli as "the
11. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
12. Id. at 812.
13. Id. at 825.
14. Id. at 822.
15. Id.
16. 10 Cal. 3d 824, 519 P.2d 575, 112 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1974).
17. Id. at 827-30, 519 P.2d at 577-80, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 529-32.
18. Id. at 833, 519 P.2d at 581, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
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famous trial lawyer who first employed 'modern demonstrative evidence' in the courtroom" and as being "onto unabridged Scotch" was
not worthy of constitutional protection.' 9 If the activity is not protected, the advertising can be grounds for discipline if the lawyer exhibits "wilfulness, either a desire to solicit business or a substantial
"20
certainty that the ad would generate business ...
In the political arena, it would seem that if a lawyer is involved in
protected activity, the lawyer's conduct is protected. Under such circumstances, it cannot be grounds for disciplinary action unless the motive to promote practice is the principal one. In contrast, advertising,
though not principally aimed toward expanding the lawyer's practice,
can be construed as misconduct if it includes language designed to expand the practice.
Limitations on Advertising by Professions
The right to limit advertising flows naturally from the power of the
state to regulate individual professional conduct in the public interest.
The United States Supreme Court, in Semler v. Oregon State Board of
Dental Examiners,2' examined an Oregon statute prohibiting dentists
from advertising their professional superiority and prices, from using
large displays, glaring light signs, advertising solicitors and publicity
agents, and from advertising "free dental work," "guaranteed work,"
and "painless operations."2 2 The Court found this to be a reasonable
exercise of the state's power. Speaking for the Court, Justice Hughes
stated that "[tihe community is concerned in providing safeguards not
only against deception, but against practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an unseemly ri' 23
valry which would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous.
The idea that advertising is appropriate for the commercial world
but not for the professional world often has been applied to lawyers. In
Barton v. State Bar of California24 an attorney published an advertisement in a daily newspaper, in violation of the State Bar rule against
25
soliciting.
The profession of law, said the California Supreme Court, should
not be seen as a business, and the public should not get the idea that
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 839-40, 519 P.2d at 585-87, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 537-39.
Id. at 840, 519 P.2d at 587, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
294 U.S. 608 (1935).
1933 Or. Laws, p. 210, § 2 (current version at OR. REV. STAT. § 679.140 (1977)).
294 U.S. at 612.
209 Cal. 677, 289 P. 818 (1930).
Id. at 678, 289 P. at 818.
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members of the profession think it is. It can be readily understood, the
court opined, how unfavorably the public would react toward the profession if a large page advertisement appeared extolling the learning
26
ability and capacity of the attorney to "get results.
The advertising of prices for professional services has been a particular target of state regulation, to be balanced against the public need
to know. Cases concerning the dispensing of eyeglasses provide a useful insight. In 1963, a New Mexico statute prohibiting advertising
27
the sale of eyeglasses was upheld against the owners of a newspaper.
The New Mexico paper carried the advertisement of a Texas optometrist. In upholding the statute, the United States Supreme Court recognized the state interest in professional regulation in an area subject to
interstate commerce. 28 In another case, a possibly less myopic threejudge federal court enjoined enforcement of a California statutory ban
on advertising the price of eyeglasses and optometrical services. In so
holding the court acknowledged the consumer plaintiffs' first amend29
ment rights to receive such information.
There has also been a fair dosage of cases on the advertising of
prescription drug prices. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.30 a Virginia statute declared it
"unprofessional" ' 3' for a licensed pharmacist to publish or advertise the
price of prescription drugs. Violation of the statute subjected the pharmacist to loss of license. Acknowledging that regulation of pharmacies
was within the power of the state, the United States Supreme Court
held that this did not include the right to interfere with the consumers'
right to know the price of drugs. 32 Consumers who because of age,
disability, illness or poverty could only afford the lowest price of drugs
needed this information which was not otherwise available.
Such advertising serves as a tool to educate rather than deceive. In
Terry v. CalforniaState Boardof Pharmacy33 a consumer challenged a
California statute that prevented pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. The District Court for the Northern District of
California held that while the state "has legitimate interests in controlling artificial demand for prescription drugs, preventing misleading ad26. Id.at 683, 289 P. at 820.
27. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
28. Id. at 428-29.
29. Terminal-Hudson Elecs., Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075
(C.D. Cal. 1976).
30. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
31. Id. at 752.
32. Id. at 763-64.
33. 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
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vertising, maintaining professional standards, and preventing forgery
of prescriptions," the statute "only minimally [advanced] the interests
asserted, and in any event [did] not do so by the means least restrictive
of the plaintiffs' burdened First Amendment freedoms. ' 34 Here, said
the court, there was no touting of the product to create a commercial
transaction that would not otherwise occur, since prescription drugs
35
can be purchased only when prescribed.
Lawyer Advertising and the "Right to Know"
In Consumers Union v. American Bar Association,36 Consumers
Union sought to establish "the right to know" about legal services.
This right, the complaint alleged, was inhibited by the ABA rule which
allowed a lawyer to list certain minimal information only in a list certified by the ABA. 37 Consumers Union sought to publish a directory of
lawyers in Arlington County, Virginia, using a questionnaire to elicit
information concerning each lawyer's office, education, legal activities,
affiliations, area of concentration, fees and billing procedures, and client relations. They asked the ABA whether the proposed directory
would be approved. The ABA indicated that certification required the
payment of a $750 fee, which could not be waived, even though Consumers Union was a non-profit organization and the directory was to
be sold at cost. An Arlington County lawyer was informed by the State
Bar Legal Ethics Committee that responding to the questionnaire and
being listed in the directory would indeed violate the disciplinary
rule.

38

Consumers Union claimed that the rule violated their constitutional rights to gather, publish, and receive important factual information necessary to enable them to obtain the most effective and
satisfactory legal representation. Agreeing with Consumers Union, a
three-judge panel of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that the rule was "overly broad" and unconstitutionally
restrictive of the plaintiffs' rights "to receive and gather consumer information. ' '39 As stated in Griswold v. Connecticut,40 "the right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print,
34. 395 F. Supp. at 106.
35. Id. at 102.
36. 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976). (The ABA was, however, dismissed from the suit,
leaving the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia State Bar as defendants. Id. at 509, 523.)
37. Id. at 510.
38. 427 F. Supp. at 511.
39. Id. at 523.
40. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read."' 4'
If none of the preceding cases rattled the foundations of the noble
profession, Bates v. Arizona 42 was a major tremor. John Bates and Van
O'Steen opened a "legal clinic" in Phoenix, Arizona, providing routine
legal services at modest fees to persons of moderate income. After two
years of less than moderate income, they began advertising their services in the Arizona Republic, listing prices for uncontested divorce,
adoption, nonbusiness bankruptcy and change of name.4 3 This violated the Arizona Supreme Court's Disciplinary Rule against lawyer
advertising. 44 The United States Supreme Court followed the beacon
shone by its previous cases and added a few candlepower:
to first amendment protection, if
(1) commercial speech is entitled
45
not false or misleading;
(2) advertising legal services is not inherently misleading 46 (nor was
the Bates ad itself misleading); 47 and
48
(3) consumers are entitled to this information.
Despite Consumers and Bates, the constitutional free speech protections seemingly would not automatically invalidate reasonable restrictions on legal advertising. However, such restrictions must be
based on some public interest and run the gauntlet of constitutional
specificity. Providing reasonable alternatives, each having a less chilling effect on free speech, would be helpful.
Right to Counsel
At present, the United States Supreme Court recognizes no express
right to legal representation in civil cases. Both federal and state courts
regularly appoint counsel to represent indigent criminal litigants. Al49
though no right to legal services in other than criminal prosecutions
flows from constitutional sources, certain organizations have raised this
41. Id. at 482.
42. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
43. Id. at 354.
44. ARiz. SuP. CT. R. 29(a), D.R. 2-101(B).
45. 433 U.S. at 363. See also Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
46. 433 U.S. at 372.
47. Id. at 381-82.
48. Id. at 364, 374.
49. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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issue in their efforts to provide legal services for their members. For
many years, organizations offering services of an attorney to their
members have been met with the prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law. An automobile club, 50 a banking association, 5 a trade
association, 52 or an association of taxpayers could not provide legal
53
services for members.
In 1963, the tide turned with NAACP v. Button.54 The NAACP
retained attorneys to represent members of minority groups in their
grievances concerning racial discrimination, obtained plaintiffs for desegregation actions by holding meetings, and passed out consent
forms. 5 5 The United States Supreme Court overruled Virginia's attempt to forbid the activity as an improper solicitation of legal business. 56 The following year the Court considered Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar.57 Here, the Virginia Bar
sought to enjoin the union from advising members to obtain legal
assistance before settling compensation claims and recommending specific lawyers to handle these claims. 58 The Court held that the workers
themselves were not engaged in the practice of law, nor were they or
their lawyers soliciting legal business. 59 Similarly, in United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association,60 an attempt to prevent the
union from hiring attorneys on a salaried basis to assist members in
asserting their legal rights was held to violate freedom of speech, assembly and petition.6 1 Finally, in United Transportation Union v. State
Bar,62 the State Bar of Michigan sought to enjoin the union from engaging in group legal activity, where the union recommended to its
members that Chicago compensation attorneys be employed at a fixed
maximum fee. 63 The Supreme Court found that an injunction would
prevent union members from meeting the cost of legal representation
and securing meaningful access to the courts. The giving or furnishing
of legal advice, said the Court, was itself protected by the first amend50. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 8 (1925).
51. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 98 (1933).
52. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 162 (1936).

53. People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 2d
823 (1933).
54. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
55. Id. at 420-22.
56. Id. at 444.
57. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 6-7.
60. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
61. Id. at 221-22.
62. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
63. Id. at 577.
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ment. 64
Is the advertising of group legal services also protected? In Jacksonville Bar Association v. Wilson 6 5 an advertisement by a lawyer referral service of the Jacksonville Bar Association was challenged by an
66
individual practitioner, who was not a member of the association.
The Florida Supreme Court held that the association was:
an organization of lawyers, which all in a given area may join, working cooperatively to lower the barrier between the legal profession
and the public. Certainly the public must be attracted, and must be
apprised of the availability of the service. . . . Counselling, or preventive legal advice before trouble commences, will tend to keep
people out of the courts, within the letter and spirit of the Canons of
Ethics. And alerting the public to the existence of a service, under
bar sponsorship, which will provide such preventive advice at a reasonable fee is not unethical,
but must redound to the benefit both of
67
the public and of the bar.
It can be argued that most of these cases turn on issues of free
speech protection rather than a specific right to counsel. But the right
to legal representation and the right to know about possible services
through advertising seem inexorably connected. The right to advertise
group legal services stands reasonably established. From the consumer's as well as the practitioner's standpoint there appears to be little
reason why the same right does not extend fully to the individual lawyer.
UnreasonableRestriction upon Commerce
Attempts by bar associations to provide minimum fee schedules
are now universally under attack, as a violation of antitrust laws. The
principal case, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,6 8 involved such a minimum fee schedule. The plaintiffs, after diligent search, were unable to
obtain an attorney willing to perform a title examination for less than
the minimum fee (one percent of the value of the property) established
by the local bar association. 69 The lender financing the purchase required the plaintiffs to furnish a title examination, which could be per70
formed only by a member of the Virginia Bar.
64. Id. at 582.
65. 102 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1958).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 295.
68. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
69. Id. at 776. (Plaintiffs wrote to 36 Fairfax County attorneys, asking what they would
charge for a title search. None of the 19 attorneys who responded indicated that they would
charge less than the minimum fee set by the local bar association. Id.)
70. VIRGINIA STATE BAR COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 239 (1965).
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Speaking through Chief Justice Burger, the United States Supreme
Court found that the schedule and its enforcement mechanisms constituted price fixing, in violation of the Sherman Act, 7 1 since the fee
schedule, rather than being merely advisory, operated as a fixed, rigid
price floor. 72 The schedule was enforced through the prospect of disciplinary action by the state bar, by reason of the lawyers' desire to conform to announced professional norms, and by implicit assurance that
other lawyers would not compete by underbidding. 7 3 The State Bar
Committee on Legal Ethics had previously stated that although a lawyer had an ethical duty to charge a lower fee in a deserving case, if a
lawyer "purely for his own advancement intentionally and regularly
bill[ed] less than the customary charge of the bar for similar services,
. . . [in order to] increase his business with resulting personal gain, it
[would become] a form of solicitation contrary to Canon 27. .. .
Some eleven years later, the Committee amplified its stand, stating that
"evidence that an attorney habitually charges less than the suggested
minimum fee schedule adopted by his local bar association, raises a
75
presumption that such lawyer is guilty of misconduct.1
The Fairfax County Bar Association argued that its activity should
be exempt from consideration under the Sherman Act because it involved "a learned profession. ' 76 The County Bar also argued that
competition was inconsistent, since providing service to the commu77
nity, not enhancing profits, was the goal of professional activities.
The Court found this argument thinly veiled. Because Virginia lacked
an integrated bar, and the fee schedule was not adopted by its supreme
court or legislature, it could not claim that the fee-setting process was
"state action" and therefore exempt from the Sherman Act under the
doctrine of Parker v. Brown .78 To take advantage of the state action
exemption, the activities must have been required and not merely
prompted by the state.79 However, the Court did restate that states
have a compelling interest in the practice of the profession and may
decide that "forms of competition usual in the business world may be
' 80
demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
421 U.S. at 781.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 777 n.4.
Id. at 777-78.
Id. at 786.
Id.
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
421 U.S. at 790.
Id. at 792 (quoting United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952)).
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Two years after the Goldfarb decision, Bates v. Arizona8 l presented
the Court with state action. In Bates, the Court properly held that a
state rule prohibiting the commercial advertising of routine legal serv82
ices and their costs does not violate the Sherman Act under Parker.
Yet the Court went on to recognize that a ban on advertising increases
"the difficulty of discovering the lowest-cost seller of acceptable ability."' 83 It would appear then that rules which have the effect of inhibiting price or service competition through advertising which is not false
or misleading will meet serious and continued opposition. A ban on
commercial advertising perpetuates the market portion of established
lawyers. Advertising, though an added cost, may permit rather than
prevent the young attorney from competing in the market.
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS:

THE NATURE OF ADVERTISING

The codfish lays ten thousand eggs,
The homely hen lays one.
The codfish never cackles
To tell you what she's done.
And so we scorn the codfish,
While the humble hen we prize,
Which only goes to show you
84
That it pays to advertise.
For those concerned with the issue of legal advertising, some
thought should be given to the nature of advertising itself. In its best
image advertising is said to be like a road map, directing travellers to a
destination. In fact, advertising has a two-fold objective: it provides
product information and persuades people to use the product.
Advertising provides consumers with relevant facts to make
choices, between producers of the same service (between two lawyers)
or different services (a visit to the doctor or a visit to a lawyer). Advertising will perfect competition but competition already exists. As a
spokesperson in the United States Department of Justice has said, "The
consumers of legal services are just as entitled to the benefits of competition as are the consumers of other services." 8 5
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that advertising can lower
81. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
82. Id. at 363.
83. Id. at 377. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976).
84. Anonymous, "It Pays To Advertise," in BARTLETr'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 1101 (14th
ed. 1968).
85. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 22, 1974 at 9 (quoting Joseph Sims, Special Ass't, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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prices to the consumers. A study of the effect of advertising on the
price of eyeglasses revealed that in states where there was no ban on
advertising, the eyeglasses cost $17.98, whereas where there was a complete ban on advertising, the eyeglasses cost $37.48.86
Lawyer referral services, group legal plans and prepaid legal insurance programs are already advertising, in competition with individual
practitioners and firms. Their advertisements are primarily of the informational type. If persuasion is involved, it speaks to the appropriateness of seeking legal advice rather than the use of the particular
service offered. If it is proper for them, is it less proper for the individual lawyer or firm? The word "solicitation" has acquired a reputation
equivalent only to the Victorian notion of sex. As the inimitable Samuel Johnson said, "It is wrong to stir up law suits; but once it is certain that a law suit is to go on, there is nothing wrong in a lawyer's
endeavoring that he shall have the benefit, rather than another. . . . I
would have him inject a little hint now and then to prevent his being
87
overlooked.
We all solicit. The boy or girl at a college dance hopes to meet a
likeable friend for mutual benefit. Lawyers are no different. They iitially try to graduate from the name schools of law, to be on the law
review, to clerk for a learned justice. Once in practice, whether individually or with a firm, they join in community activities that afford them
some prominence. The motive as well as the result cannot help but be
two-fold. It is hypocritical to say otherwise for most attorneys. Attorneys want to serve but we also want to be available to be retained-if
qualified.
Most disconcerting to the notion that lawyers should not solicit
business is that business entertainment is a deductible fact of a taxpayer's life-for lawyers as for anyone else. This is amusingly revealed
in the amazing voyage of the Chee Chee V, a worthy ship whose owner
testified:
[Clertainly there has been more entertainment done on sailboats in
recent years. That's what the glamor part is. I submit it may be a
sneaky way to practice law. I do think utilizing a little glamor, giving
somebody what they think they want-it may be your tie or the curl
of your hair-I don't know how one selects a lawyer, but I have been
fortunate. I have had a few cases on the books that involve millions
of dollars coming directly from [the boating] field. . . . I have used
the boat primarily for entertainment and promotion with the idea of
86. Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337, 342
(1972).
87.

J. BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON:

1776 at 581 (Mod. Lib. ed.).
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creating clients and obtaining legal retainers. 88
Fortunately, the taxpayer was not allowed to exempt himself from the
general rule that entertainment expenditures must relate to specific
business and not the seeking of future business by asserting that the
89
Code of Professional Responsibility prevented him from advertising!
Nevertheless, the comments speak for themselves. Would not some
regulated form of advertising be fair treatment for those who cannot
afford or would prefer not to resort to the hypocrisy of the Chee Chee
F?
ADVERTISING AND THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES

Novel and noble steps have been taken to improve the delivery of
legal services to consumers. We have only to look at the vast array:
public defenders, legal aid, group legal service plans, prepaid group
legal insurance, lawyer referral plans. The results of a 1973-74 survey
demonstrate, however, that there is still much to be done in improving
the public image of the profession. The data released by the ABA Special Committee to Survey Legal Needs is amazing. This first comprehensive market research ever done on the incidence of personal legal
problems and the use of lawyers indicated:
(1) To find a lawyer, forty-six percent of the people surveyed said
they would have consulted friends, relatives or neighbors, and fifteen
percent would have used the telephone book. Forty-five percent met
lawyers through organizations to which they belonged.
(2) More than one third of American adults have never consulted a
lawyer and slightly more than a quarter have consulted a lawyer only
once. One in five said they had considered consulting a lawyer but

had not done so-for many reasons, including lack of information.

(3) More than one third believed a lawyer would charge between
$21-34 for one-half hour of consultation. In contrast, eighty-five typical lawyer referral services reported fees under $20, with the average

fee being $10.90
The survey perhaps indicates that the public generally may not recognize when they have a "legal problem," do not have sufficient methods
to seek out qualified legal assistance, and are unaware of (and concerned about) the cost of legal services.
Despite these results, arguments against lawyer advertising continue to abound. Some of these arguments and possible responses are:
(1) Advertising by lawyers willfavor establishedorfinancially suc88. Handelman v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 1067, 1073 n.7, 1074 n.9 (2d Cir. 1975).
89. Id. at 1074 n.i1.
90. See generally B. CURRAN and F. SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1974).
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cessul attorneys who can afford advertising and raise significant barriers
to entry of those who cannot. It is true that the large established firms
will have greater discretionary income to pay for advertising. However, most of these firms deal with established corporate clients where
advertising will probably not be the means of retaining present clients
or securing additional ones. It is also true that advertising may eliminate those with a marginal practice, but so might any improvement in
the delivery of services, such as the use of word processing equipment
or paralegals.
(2) The cost of advertising will bepassed on to consumers. While
the cost of legal services may increase because of advertising, it is
equally possible that increased knowledge of legal services, particularly
about fees, will reduce the cost of some legal services to an extent
greater than the advertising expense. Also, lawyers who choose not to
advertise would be free to provide a lower fee to clients, just as are
lawyers who do not accept credit cards. All the costs of legal practice
such as rent, malpractice insurance, participation in unrecompensed legal services, are reflected in an office's fee structure. There is no reason
for excepting advertising.
(3) Advertising of legalfees is inherently misleading. While deception can occur in fee advertisement, such deception is equally possible in an initial telephone or face-to-face contact with a client and the
provider of any service, including legal service. Just as the agreement
to observe a minimum fee schedule is a violation of the antitrust laws,
so a blanket agreement not to advertise prices may run aground on the
shoals of Goldfarb. There is no incentive in the long run for an advertiser to mislead in advertising fees, since such conduct may be the subject of complaints and possible discipline. It is better that the client
have some indication of a range of fees offered by other lawyers to use
as a background to the discussion with a lawyer in that first meeting.
(4) Advertising ofprices cannot assist in the selection of a qualifed
lawyer. Since the layman in search of a lawyer has extremely limited
data at best, price information would provide one criterion on which
prospective clients can compare lawyers in various service specialties.
For years schedules of operating costs and office visit fees have been a
part of group medical and hospital plans. Group legal services and
lawyer referral services are already quoting fees or ranges of fees and
advertising such fees in approved communications.
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(5) Advertising by lawyers would diminish the stature of the
profession. It is doubtful that advertising can damage the dignity of
the legal profession post-Watergate. While there would be abuses,
there are already abuses by some lawyers who have been and will continue to be subject to disciplinary action by the Bar. Giving the public
a better understanding of legal services will diminish fear and suspicion.
(6) Advertising will result in stirring up improper suits. In contrast, greater publicity, by remedying the information gap, would reduce the necessity of going to the law in later situations. The annual
legal check-up offered by some bar associations and a few group plans
can provide the same preventive service that periodic physical checkups do in the health field.
In sum, it appears that the great advertising controversy is rutted
in two paths: All advertising should be prohibited, except as expressly
authorized; or all advertising should be permitted, subject to laws respecting deceptive advertising-if the laws are violated, then sanctions
should be imposed. The first of these paths does not seem to be fulfilling the public's present right to and need for better access to legal services and lawyers' right and duty to provide them. It is argued that the
second path would permit irreparable damage that could not be sufficiently mitigated by subsequent legal action.
It has been suggested that the advertising of legal services through
the Yellow Pages and law lists is a sufficient step in providing increased
information. The problems with this are that law lists are seldom available to the public, and Yellow Pages simply do not permit price advertising at the present time, even to the extent approved by the ABA.
WHAT'S THE PRESENT TREND--AND WHY?

A March 1978 poll by the ABA, based on 599 telephone interviews, revealed that only three percent of the nation's lawyers have advertised. Eighty-nine percent said they will not or probably will not
advertise. Only a handful in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Cleveland,
and Sacramento have taken to advertising on television. 9 1
The publicity given the Los Angeles Legal Clinic of Jacoby &
Meyers in the November 20, 1972 Newsweek article 92 initially led to
disciplinary investigation. Almost five years later, in August 1977,
91. Is Advertising Laying an Egg' Lawyers May Be More Interested in Solicitation, 64
A.B.A.J. 673 (1978).
92. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 1972, at 92.
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there were four Jacoby & Meyers clinics, when the firm went on the air
with a thirty-second message. Now there are seventeen clinics. The
firm believes that advertising is essential to an operation which specializes in providing a handful of legal services to middle income clients-to generate the necessary volume of small cases.
Many lawyers are not happy with their own experimentation, despite the perceived need to inform people that legal services are available at reasonable prices, and that professional services should be
advertised as a reasonable alternative to the non-attorney bankruptcy
and divorce ads that appear daily in metropolitan newspapers. The
cost of advertising did not support the new business generated.
In Chicago, some lawyers have taken space on the benches at bus
stops. A Waukegan firm now has a "dignified" sign in electric lights.
A few lawyers have regular announcements on a Chicago FM station.
In contrast, the Illinois State Bar Association counsels greater use of
institutional advertising and lawyer referral services.
Some of the questions still to be answered were noted by the ABA
at its August meeting:
(1) Should a distinction be drawn between direct mail advertising and advertising in other print media?
(2) Can a distinction be drawn between advertising and solicitation?
(3) Is the reason that some advertisers have found newspaper
advertising comparatively ineffective due in large or small part to
where the advertisements are run in the newspaper? Is a limitation
on lawyer advertisements to the classified section of the newspaper in
the best interest of either the lawyer or the public?
(4) Are representations of specialties or areas of concentration
in advertisements by lawyers actually quality representations?
(5) What is the long term prognosis for the continued existence
and viability of the sole practitioner or small firm when advertising
and office economics of scale become more prevalent?
(6) Is institutional advertisement a workable alternative to the
cost and difficulty of individual advertising?
SUMMARY

Experimentation both by individuals and organized bar should be
encouraged. Advertising by individual attorneys can be misleading,
and such advertising does not serve the public interest. But the solution
is not to prohibit individual advertisements because they may be competitive. Indeed, individual practice itself is competitive. Competitive
advertising can be factual, in good taste, and need not be misleading
(i.e., hopefully not carefully tailored advertisements-'"suits finely
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pressed"). It may have the effect of driving the cost of legal services
down, to the point where more Americans can be effective consumers,
due to greater knowledge and lower prices. And, of course, there may
be fewer attorneys in the "business." There are not many Danbury
hatters around these days, either. 93

93. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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